RA 4200, some thoughts
First of all, Republic Act No. 4200 (otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Law) is a CRIMINAL statute that penalizes violation of PRIVACY as defined by it.
Second of all, the Act also LEGALIZES wiretapping under conditions prescribed by it.
Third of all, what the statute prohibits to further discourage the acts penalized is the ADMISIBILITY IN EVIDENCE of the “communication or spoken word or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the (communication or spoken word) or any part thereof, or any information therein contained” so obtained or secured in violation its provisions.
On the first point, as a criminal statute, RA 4200 should be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.
On the second point, if the communication is not private, the statute is not supposed to apply. Now, is a communication between the President and a COMELEC official about the conduct of a presidential election private? (Note: I am focusing my question to this and only this portion of the recorded communication in the tape).
On the third point -
a) If the record of the communication or spoken word is used in a “judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation” but not introduced in evidence, and therefore there is no occasion to consider its ADMISSIBLITY, is the statute violated? (This could essentially be the point of Senator Chiz Escudero in another dimension as further elaborated by lawyer Jaxius here.)
b) If the introduction in evidence of the so-called “poisoned fruit” is being attempted in such a trial, hearing or investigation, who is the proper party to object to its admissibility?
c) May the objection be waived or is the right to object on ground of admissibility essentially waivable since it is a PRIVATE right?
d) In the case of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, if her privacy right has been violated, is she not deemed to have waived it by virtue of her public acknowledgement of the content of the recording in the “lapse in judgment” speech? Or as the country’s chief law enforcer, should she not waive her private right in the public interest?
e) Is PGMA deemed to have authorized the wiretapping by her conduct of not faithfully executing the law against probable violators and therefore barred from availing of the benefits under the law, if any?
f) Since Garci denies he is the same person whose voice is recorded on the tape in question, could he be at any time an improper party to object to its admissibility?
g) When is it seasonable to object, at any time reference is made to the tape or only at such time that the tape is being introduced in evidence, which the tape being essentially a “real” (not a testimonial) evidence should be at the “offer of evidence” stage of the trial, hearing or investigation?
FINALLY, considering the well-nigh plenary nature of policymaking by Congress, may the SC interfere via a TRO with congressional hearing in aid of legislation? On the other hand, may Congress assert its prerogative to cite anyone in contempt who is enforcing such TRO, if so issued?
Second of all, the Act also LEGALIZES wiretapping under conditions prescribed by it.
Third of all, what the statute prohibits to further discourage the acts penalized is the ADMISIBILITY IN EVIDENCE of the “communication or spoken word or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the (communication or spoken word) or any part thereof, or any information therein contained” so obtained or secured in violation its provisions.
On the first point, as a criminal statute, RA 4200 should be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.
On the second point, if the communication is not private, the statute is not supposed to apply. Now, is a communication between the President and a COMELEC official about the conduct of a presidential election private? (Note: I am focusing my question to this and only this portion of the recorded communication in the tape).
On the third point -
a) If the record of the communication or spoken word is used in a “judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation” but not introduced in evidence, and therefore there is no occasion to consider its ADMISSIBLITY, is the statute violated? (This could essentially be the point of Senator Chiz Escudero in another dimension as further elaborated by lawyer Jaxius here.)
b) If the introduction in evidence of the so-called “poisoned fruit” is being attempted in such a trial, hearing or investigation, who is the proper party to object to its admissibility?
c) May the objection be waived or is the right to object on ground of admissibility essentially waivable since it is a PRIVATE right?
d) In the case of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, if her privacy right has been violated, is she not deemed to have waived it by virtue of her public acknowledgement of the content of the recording in the “lapse in judgment” speech? Or as the country’s chief law enforcer, should she not waive her private right in the public interest?
e) Is PGMA deemed to have authorized the wiretapping by her conduct of not faithfully executing the law against probable violators and therefore barred from availing of the benefits under the law, if any?
f) Since Garci denies he is the same person whose voice is recorded on the tape in question, could he be at any time an improper party to object to its admissibility?
g) When is it seasonable to object, at any time reference is made to the tape or only at such time that the tape is being introduced in evidence, which the tape being essentially a “real” (not a testimonial) evidence should be at the “offer of evidence” stage of the trial, hearing or investigation?
FINALLY, considering the well-nigh plenary nature of policymaking by Congress, may the SC interfere via a TRO with congressional hearing in aid of legislation? On the other hand, may Congress assert its prerogative to cite anyone in contempt who is enforcing such TRO, if so issued?